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Previously in Futures, I discussed a word that we use to form an abstract futures
concept: “millennium” [1]. In its most common current usage, “millennium” is an
example of a word that provides, and one might even say controls, a future orien-
tation for us. In the present essay, I am taking a different approach to the role of
the word that I will be discussing. This word is not an example of a future-orien-
tation; rather it is more of an example of language about future-orientation. The word
is “expectation”. To make this distinction clearer, it may help to borrow some of
the terminological distinctions made by the American logician, C.S. Peirce. First of
all, for Peirce, and indeed for my present purposes, signs include words. More
specifically, in a paper dated 1867, May 14th, and published in the Proceedings of
the American Academy of Arts and Science (Boston), VII (1868) [2] Peirce divided
signs into three categories based upon their relationship to their object—Icons, Indi-
ces, and Symbols. (Peirce himself used the convention of capitalising the words.)
He defined “Icon” as a sign determined by its object “by virtue of its own internal
nature”. In comparison, he defined “Index” as a sign determined by its object “by
virtue of being in real relation to it”, such as when smoke is a sign of fire. A Symbol,
according to Peirce, is a sign determined by its object “only in the sense that it will
be so interpreted”. A Symbol thus depends upon conventions or habits.
Thus, borrowing from Peirce’s helpful terminology, one could say that while my
previous discussion of the word “millennium” was mostly in its current capacity to
give meaning as an icon, I am now regarding “expectation” more as symbolic in
the way that it, as a word, gives us meaning. Nevertheless, my exploration of “expec-
tation” remains an exploration of the word, the creation of meaning through it as a
part of language, and to a lesser degree, the creation of expectations through langu-
age. Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and natural scientists would all have
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different and additional things to say about the concept or phenomenon of expec-
tation—I want to focus on the word. But while the terminological distinctions which
I borrow from Peirce are helpful in distinguishing “millennium” from “expectation”,
there is one important way in which my project is very different than his. Insofar
as he was interested in a science of meaning, I am interested in an art. For his
science, he noted that the history of words, not their etymology, was their key to
meaning. For Peirce, that is to say that one must inquire into all aspects of the
relationship of signs to objects, including the character of signs and the relationships
to the thoughts by which we connect signs to things. I find this to be unnecessarily
constricting, given the creative element inherent in using language and given the
need to keep open the possibility of multiple futures through language. To see what
properly constitutes research into meaning for the purposes of an art, I will look to
both a history and an etymology of “expectation”.
1. An etymology
At least since Socrates bantered with Gorgias, wanting to know the definition of
the art of “rhetoric”, we Westerners have been believers in the power of defining.
Prior to that, in classical Greek rhetoric, definition was considered to be just one of
the many common topics under which arguments were grouped for particular subjects
or occasions. For these arguments, one could create the substance of a speech—a
process known as “invention”. (Other common topics would have included compari-
son, relationship, circumstances and testimony.) These common topics of invention
were not held to be “common” because of some common hardwiring of their users,
but because of the common cultural values and constraints that would result in
mediating the world through language in recognisably similar ways. (It remains a
challenge for future studies to recognise the tendency toward common topics, while
maintaining the possibility of multiple commonalities, but taking up that challenge
is for another time and place.) Then and there, just as now and here, the definition
of a term is commonly regarded as a monad of knowledge, if not truth; a fact that
even leads to wisdom. In keeping with the contemporary fashion of irony, one may
notice that in announcing a discussion of “expectation” one creates an expectation—
an expectation that the discussion will need to define its featured term.
Moreover, if we go so far as to accept the idea that truth is a necessary preface
to goodness, seeking definition could deliver us to virtue. In connecting these roles
of knowledge and virtue, literary critic Kenneth Burke concluded that “The Good
Book” is the apt name not for the Bible, but for the dictionary—today’s standard
source of definitions.
Looking to the etymological root of “expectation”, the Oxford English Dictionary
tells us that “expect” was a word originally associated with sight in Latin: expectare,
to look out for. In Greek, the word “idein”, from which we get the English “idea”,
was also associated with sight. Like “idea”, the word “expect” has undergone a nearly
complete metamorphosis. Now both words are concerned only with the abstraction of
sight known as knowing. In using either word—“idea” or “expectation”—we have
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lost sight of the past connections that both words had with sight, and now have
remaining only the abstractions concerned with knowing. The loss of this connection
provides the basis for what Berger and Luckman [3] referred to as a “social construc-
tion”, or what Peirce referred to as a Symbol—a sign determined by its object only
by virtue of convention and habit, not “by virtue of its own internal nature” as would
an Icon, or “by virtue of being in real relation to it”, as would an Index.
If we remain cognisant of the connection with sight that the word “expectation”
has, we would recognise that when we say that we “expect”, we are reporting that
we have a vision. And in having a vision, we are looking away from ourselves at
something in another place or another time. In fact, this looking away even applies
to ourselves, as Sartre points out when he says “I await myself in the future”. More
than that, we have narrowed the focus of this looking to mean looking away toward
the futures, not toward the pasts; a tendency found in the word “retrospect”. Thus,
once we have established the connection with vision that “expect” has through its
root syllable of “-spect”, an important distinction remains between it and “retro-
spect”. The future-orientation of “expect” would mean that our vision is a vision of
possibilities, not an attempt to describe past actualities. So when we say that we
have expectations of ourselves, we must posit one or more visions of where and
who we will be at some point in the future. How do we go about constructing these
visions? What is the material that we use and by what criteria are we able to say
that our actual selves ever meet these possible selves that we have envisioned?
We may say “I’m trying to be someone I’m not”. How peculiar. How would this
be possible? What could it mean? How could it mean? How would one person know
two selves sufficiently to make this statement? Here we have two different levels of
expectation. In the first, the speaker has evidently laid out some image of himself
that “awaits him in the future”, to return to the translation of Sartre’s elegant phrase.
This he may only do if he expects that he will experience being in that scene, being
that person, fitting that image, in real time and space, although at a later time and
different space. In this way it becomes a little plainer that with the help of the word
“expectation” we can talk about the future in ways that suggest that we know it,
and in ways that might even suggest we can control it. But “expectation” also has
its own limits and perhaps even some limits for us when we employ its powers. I
will return to this shortly.
The second level of expectation in this statement is the image that the speaker
has of himself as someone other than the one which he posited in the future, awaiting
himself. In this second notion of expectation, the speaker is drawing upon the past,
and if possible, the present images of himself, and announcing that they in some
way are sufficiently different from the self that awaits him in the future such that
the two will never meet. Thus, when he lays the matrix of his vision over what he
considers to be the picture of his actual present, something is preventing the lines
of the matrix from ever aligning. Here, he is awaiting not himself in the future, but
someone else; a someone else whom he has rejected; a someone else whom he does
not want to be, but suddenly, presently, finds himself being. What is it about our
use of “expectation” that makes it possible to reject ourselves? What is the nature
of the space between the lines of the matrix of the expected self and the lines of
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the snapshot of the actual self such that we could comfortably say “I don’t feel like
myself today”? This self that we have envisioned, that we expect, is a self that is
not like our actual self in some aspect. What aspect? If the vision is one of a perfect
form, of a person whom we would like to be, then we should examine the criteria
by which we have created that form. If they are moral criteria, we can see that the
commonality of defining words in a way that makes speech possible may also be a
commonality of defining ourselves that makes it possible to not be a person fitting
the commonality. In trying to be someone whom we are not, or in not feeling like
ourselves, we may indeed find ourselves not fitting in with the expectation of a self
common to that community—a self created by the image of expectation and main-
tained in the language of common topic invention.
2. A history
Returning to the limits of “expectation”, one finds that the history of the word
“expectation” carries controls on the way that we use it, and on what it means, and
on what we can possibly mean when we use it—but we may not be conscious of
many, or most, of these things. Here I am not suggesting some sort of magical
powers carried by the word as a tangible object, like a linguistic Trojan horse. Rather,
I mean the acceptable contexts for the use of the word that we adopt in any living
language. The setting of the rules of acceptability is not just the province of language
academies—it is the province of the language users as well. The connection between
sight and knowing, in the past, the present and in the future, is common in many
other English colloquial phrases as well, of course, as with “looking back on it, I
should have known better”, “I see what you mean” and “I get the picture”. And
even though we have evolved “expectation” to mean exclusively the abstract sense
of anticipation, we also still use verbs with literal denotations of sight to mean expec-
tation, as in “I look forward to your arrival”. According to the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, we first find “expectation” in 1550, and “expect” in 1560, although the
current use of “expectation” dates only to the seventeenth century. The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary concurs with the 1560 date. In theory we can hypothesise that
at some point the word did begin its current usage, and at the time of its shift in
focus, likely still carried all the standard connotations of vision. Users may not have
been conscious of how the accepted uses of the word still incorporated notions of
vision. Are we today? What might flow from becoming conscious of this? To answer
this, we might need to know more about the history of what we regard as vision.
In the ancient world, several different theories of light and vision developed. These
theories were based on the premise that there must be some form of contact between
the object of vision and the visual organ; only thus could an object stimulate or
influence the visual power and be perceived. Much of the literature on ancient
theories of vision concerns the debate between intromissionists, who believed that
objects somehow emitted rays which travelled to the eye, and extramissionists, who
believed that it was the eye which emitted the ray, which ray then travelled to an
object. Allowing this debate to spill into the underlying notions of vision associated
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with “expectation”, several different possibilities for expectations arise. An intro-
missionist might find that the world is what is and does what it does, independent
of the seer. The seer is only observing that which is there by passively receiving
rays in his eyes. But an extramissionist may interpret an expectation as an active
creating of “what is there” as he focuses the rays which emanate from his eyes on
selected objects. In ancient theories, once a direction for the ray was established,
much of the ensuing discussion concerned whether the ray was a real entity, and
the nature of the medium through which these rays passed en route to either the eye
or the object. What could this mean for expectations? Does our vision of the future
travel from our eyes to the future, or does it travel from the future to our eyes?
Generally, we would say that it is impossible, of course, to consider the existence
and operation of physical properties of light coming to us from an abstraction known
as “future(s)”. With that physical limitation, we may be tempted to conclude therefore
that the notion of vision that necessarily must be incorporated into “expectation” is
an extramissionist notion of vision–a valid inference if this were the only aspect of
the history of vision that might shed light on “expectation”. But it is not.
As historian David C. Lindberg has noted, classifying ancient theories of vision
only in terms of the direction of radiation overlooks other fundamental aspects of
ancient optics, and also make the debate among the various theories seem trivial and
those who debated it for a thousand years look foolish.
Particularly while thinking about how language might shape futures, we need to
pay attention to all of the debates. Another scheme of classification, based on the
aims and criteria of visual theory, is not only more basic, but more relevant to my
present consideration of “expectations”. Included in these debates, based on the aims
and criteria of the respective proponents, are a mathematical theory, a physical
theory, and a physiological theory. The mathematical theory, originating with Euclid
and Ptolemy in Greece, and al-Kindi in Persia, offers a geometrical explanation for
the perception of space. Although the mathematical theory may be classified as an
extramissionist theory, the aims of the theorists proposing the mathematical theory
were to develop a “mathematical theory of perception in which the visual cone [the
apex of which is at the eye] accounts for the localisation of objects in the visual
field, and the apparent size and shape of the objects” [4], not to settle the argument
over what the source of the rays is.
A second theory, the physical theory, is said to have originated with Aristotle in
Greece, had advocates in al-Razi, al-Farabi, ibn Rushd (Averroes), and ibn Sina
(Avicenna) in Persia, and Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on the European
continent. The physical theory is divided between Aristotle’s notion that vision
occurs when objects have information transmitted to the eye via a medium, and the
atomists’ theory of eidolons (from Greek, eidola, and translated often to the Latin,
simulacrum). For Aristotle, the medium is capable of taking potentially-illuminated
objects and making them actually-illuminated objects. This information is then
moved through the medium to the eye, and from the eye it is carried to the heart
via the blood. Thereby the senses can perceive the form of an object without the
matter. Importantly for Aristotle, this notion of “form” meant more than just the
shape or the outline. For my present purposes Aristotle’s notion of the medium
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remains important. The medium through which we receive (if we are
intromissionists) or produce (if we are extramissionists) visions of futures such that
we can create expectations is a social, not physical, medium. And if we extend the
comparison of Aristotle’s physical medium to the social one, we should ask whether
the social medium is capable of taking potentially-illuminated social phenomena and
making them actually-illuminated social phenomena as we create expectations.
For the atomists, the eidolons, which are thin films like the skin of a cicada or
snake, and are composed of atom assemblies, are capable of communicating the
visible attributes of objects to the eye, so as to create an impression of the object.
As such, both types of the physical tradition could be classified as intromissionist,
but the aims of works by researchers in this field were to provide a causal or physical
account of vision and to explain in physical terms how the visible qualities of objects
are communicated to the organ of sight. For research into expectations we might
well then seek to provide a causal account of expectations, and to explain in social
terms how the visible qualities of social objects are communicated to our organ
of expectations.
A third theory, the physiological theory, was announced by Galen in Greece and
brought forward by Hunain ibn Ishaq in Persia. It is concerned with the eye’s anat-
omy. The aims of the works in this tradition are to provide a physiology of sight
through the anatomy of the eye. Can we provide a physiology of expectations? Would
the anatomy of the eye, in explaining the physiology of sight, provide a physiology
of expectations? Scientists working in optics have noted that the physiological tra-
dition fails to account for the psychology of the observer, and for his or her “func-
tional capacities”, as Aristotle called them. That is to say, we do not directly observe
the rods and cones within the eye, but rather people and houses and other three-
dimensional objects. For Aristotle, explaining what one picks up as a visual input,
that is, integrated three-dimensional objects, is first and foremost in the aim of a
theory of vision.
3. Do “expectations” die, or are they immortal?
Somewhere someone (I believe it was Sartre) suggested that we plan our lives by
positing the hour of our death and working backward. Indeed it seems that adulthood
commences with one’s recognition that he or she will die at some real time in the
foreseeable future. From this final expectation cascade all of the others between then
and now. Past that point, we would have difficulty constructing expectations because
we would have difficulty forming visions. We have neither seen an afterlife, nor
death without an afterlife. Without the ability to envision it, how can we have expec-
tations about it? Naively, we may extrapolate earthly visions and augment them with
other, incongruous earthly visions, like en-visioning or imag-ining bird’s wings on
a human being in white robe and calling that a soul. Drawing on Effie Bendann’s
Death Customs: An Analytical Study of Burial Rites [5], Zygmunt Bauman [6, p.53]
notes that pre-Christian societies “tried hard to convince their members of social
guarantees of immortality. Since these were social guarantees, however, they could
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in principle be socially managed and socially distributed. (And so they were). The
promise of immortality turned into a most powerful disciplinary effort in the hands
of society. Like other socially allocated rewards, immortality could be awarded in
larger or smaller quantities, depending on the dead’s assumed possession of values
whose dominance society wished to secure or perpetuate”. Even if we do not en-
vision, that is, expect, immortality, we may attempt to speak into being the terms
and conditions of our passing from this life. Thus among the many purposes of the
death ritual is the one that gives us the comfort of en-visioning what our own passing
will look like—the expectations of our own funeral. And it is the living who inscribe
stones and monuments not only as memorials, but as visions of their own place after
death. On the other hand, if we accept Bauman’s point, and then ask how a promise
of immortality is made, we again will hear of expectations.
During a discussion taking place in “the other world”, Milan Kundera’s Goethe
explains immortality to Hemmingway, who in turn finds peace in the loss of expec-
tations:
“That’s immortality”, said Goethe. “Immortality means eternal trial”.
“If it’s eternal trial, there ought to be a decent judge. Not a narrow-minded school-
teacher with a rod in her hand”.
“A rod in the hand of a narrow-minded school teacher, that’s what eternal trial
is about. What else did you expect, Ernest?”
“I didn’t expect anything. I had hoped that after death I would at last be able to
live in peace”.
Hemmingway goes on to explain his notion of how his written words would have
delivered him from expectation:
“You did everything you could to become immortal”.
“Nonsense. I wrote books. That’s all”.
“Yes precisely!” laughed Goethe.
“I have no objection to my books being immortal. I wrote them in such a way
that nobody could delete a single word. To resist every kind of adversity. But I
myself, as a human being, as Ernest Hemingway, I don’t give a damn about
immortality!” [7, p.81]
4. Conclusion
Much more can be said about “expectations”, and much more needs to be said
about its role in determining future(s) through language. Notably absent from my
present discussion are the creation of expectations through the language of commands
and the differences in expectations created by the differences in communications
media. Do we expect a quicker response, a longer response, a more personal response
from a voicemail message than an e-mail message? Another extremely rich and
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important area for consideration is the linguistic creation of the negative, which
Kenneth Burke finds to be a defining factor of humanity, and which Ogden and
Richards explore under the heading of “negative facts”. Can we have a negative
without having first voiced an expectation of the positive? And finally, this short
consideration of the topic has not paid due attention to the collective voicing of
“expectation”—“we expect”, not just “I expect” or “you expect”.
I hope that what I have said here in some ways demonstrates the power of the word
“expectation” and also the possibilities of multiple futures due to the possibilities of
multiple visions which create these futures.
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